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DEFERENTIALISM:  A POST-ORIGINALIST 
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 
Scott Soames* 
 
In this paper, I present “Deferentialism,” a new conception of legal 
interpretation that has close affinities with originalism, while shedding 
much of its accumulated baggage.  The new conception includes two 
dimensions of deference to original sources:  one to a species of original 
meaning, and the other to a species of original intent.  The dimensions are 
ordered.  The first task is to identify the relevant original meaning; intent 
becomes constitutive, as opposed to merely evidential, only after that 
meaning has been identified.1 
The first question in interpretation is:  what does the law say, assert, or 
stipulate?  Saying, asserting, and stipulating are speech acts—or, in more 
technical philosophical terminology, illocutionary acts—as are confirming, 
denying, ordering, and promising.  Each of these involves taking a certain 
stance toward the content of the act.  To say or assert something is to 
commit oneself to it being true, as is to confirm something in the special 
case in which it has been the subject of previous interest or inquiry.  To 
deny something is to commit oneself to its being false.  To order someone 
to do something is to direct that person to make it true that he or she does 
such-and-such, while to promise to do something is to commit oneself, 
often by asserting that one promises, to making it true that one does such-
and-such.  Stipulation is similar.  For a proper authority to stipulate that, 
say, the speed limit on certain roads in New Jersey is sixty miles per hour is 
for the authority to assert that the speed limit is sixty miles per hour and for 
that very assertive act to be a, or the, crucial component in making what is 
asserted true. 
To discover what the law asserts or stipulates is, in the first instance, to 
discover what the lawmakers asserted or stipulated in adopting an 
 
*  Distinguished Professor and Director of the School of Philosophy at the University of 
Southern California.  Thanks to Andrei Marmor and David Manley for their helpful 
comments. 
 1. Deferentialism applies equally to statutory and constitutional interpretation.  This is 
unlike Justice Scalia’s originalism, where what he calls lawmakers’ “intent” is relevant for 
constitutional, but not statutory, interpretation.  What I mean by “intent” (to be explained 
below) is relevant to both.  Elsewhere I explain why and how intent, in my sense, often plays 
a larger role in constitutional interpretation than it does in statutory interpretation.  But the 
theoretical framework governing interpretation is the same in the two cases. See Scott 
Soames, Toward a Theory of Legal Interpretation, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 231, 244–59 
(2011). 
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authoritative text.  As with ordinary speech, this is usually not a function of 
the linguistic meaning alone; it is a function of meaning plus the 
background beliefs and presuppositions of participants.  In general, what a 
speaker uses a sentence S to assert or stipulate in a given context is, to a fair 
approximation, what a reasonable hearer or reader who knows the linguistic 
meaning of S, and is aware of all relevant intersubjectively available 
features of the context of the utterance, would rationally take the speaker’s 
use of S to be intended to convey and commit the speaker to.  In most 
standard linguistic communications, all parties know, and know they all 
know, the linguistic meanings of the words and sentences used, plus the 
general purpose of the communication and all relevant facts about what 
previously has been asserted or agreed upon.  Because of this, what is 
asserted or stipulated can usually be identified with what the speaker means 
and what the hearers take the speaker to mean by the words used on that 
occasion.  Applying this lesson to legal interpretation, the deferentialist 
looks for what the lawmakers meant and what any reasonable person who 
understood the linguistic meanings of their words, the publically available 
facts, the recent history in the lawmaking context, and the background of 
existing law into which the new provision is expected to fit, would take them 
to have meant.  This—not the original linguistic meaning of the words they 
used—is the content of the law as enacted. 
The point is illustrated by two well-known examples from Justice 
Antonin Scalia’s dissent in Smith v. United States.2  The relevant legal text 
in the case is the following statute:  “[A]ny person who . . . uses or carries a 
firearm [in the course of committing a crime of violence or drug 
trafficking], shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such [a] crime 
. . . be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than five 
years . . . .”3 
The key fact in the case was that Smith traded a gun for illegal drugs, 
thereby committing a crime of drug trafficking.4  The crucial question was 
whether this constituted using a firearm in the commission of such a crime 
in the sense of the statute.5  After a lower court found that it did, Smith, 
wishing to avoid the extra five years in prison, appealed to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.6  The majority upheld the lower court’s ruling, finding that 
the ordinary meaning of the phrase “uses a firearm” covers uses of any sort, 
including trading a firearm for drugs.7 
Justice Scalia’s dissent, though wrongly formulated in terms of a 
restrictive and inaccurate thesis about the ordinary meaning of the words in 
the statute, nevertheless tracked what should have been the real issue—
 
 2. 508 U.S. 223, 241 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 3. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006). 
 4. See Smith, 508 U.S. at 225–27 (majority opinion). 
 5. See id. at 228.  Oddly, the issue of carrying a firearm did not play a major role in the 
case. See generally id. at 223. 
 6. See id. at 227. 
 7. Id. at 230. 
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namely, what the lawmakers asserted in adopting the text.8  Two of his 
examples forcefully drive the point home. 
The first concerns the content of the question that an interrogative 
sentence is used to ask.  Justice Scalia writes, “When someone asks, ‘Do 
you use a cane?,’ he is not inquiring whether you have your grandfather’s 
silver-handled walking stick on display in the hall; he wants to know 
whether you walk with a cane.”9 
The second concerns the content of an assertion made in response to a 
question in a hypothetical legal proceeding.  Justice Scalia writes, “I think it 
perfectly obvious, for example, that the objective falsity requirement for a 
perjury conviction would not be satisfied if a witness answered ‘no’ to a 
prosecutor’s inquiry whether he had ever ‘used a firearm,’ even though he 
had once sold his grandfather’s Enfield rifle to a collector.”10 
In both cases, Justice Scalia is right about the content of the speech act 
performed by speakers using the words in the situations imagined.  The 
question that would standardly be asked by a use of the sentence, “Do you 
use a cane?” in an ordinary context (without special stage-setting) is:  Do 
you use a cane to walk?  The proposition asserted by saying “No, I have 
never used a firearm,” in response to the prosecutor’s inquiry is that one 
has never used a firearm as a weapon.11 
But these correct observations about the contents of the agents’ 
illocutionary acts of questioning and asserting do not translate into similarly 
correct observations about the linguistic meanings of the sentences they 
used.  The sentences “Do you use a cane?” and “I have never used a 
firearm” do not have the same meanings in the English language as the 
sentences “Do you use a cane for walking?” and “I have never used a 
firearm as a weapon.”  To be sure, the former pair of sentences can, and in 
many contexts naturally would, be used to ask the same question or make 
the same statement as corresponding uses of the latter pair.  But in other 
contexts, in which the background circumstances and presuppositions are 
different, the sentence “Do you use a cane?” can be used to ask whether you 
use a cane to prop open a window, or to protect yourself from wild dogs, 
while the sentence “I have never used a firearm” can be used to assert that 
one has never used a firearm in one’s comedy skit, or that one has never 
used a firearm for any purpose at all. 
Since a sentence containing the phrase “use a firearm” can be employed 
to assert widely different contents in different contexts, its linguistic 
meaning cannot plausibly be identified with any of those contents.  Rather, 
its meaning is a kind of schema that provides a common element to be filled 
out in different ways on different occasions.  Since the content of a law 
enacted by adopting a text containing such a sentence must be a completed, 
truth-evaluable content, there is no real alternative in the Smith case to 
 
 8. See id. at 241–43 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 9. Id. at 242. 
 10. Id. at 242 n.1. 
 11. See id. 
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identifying the legal content with what Congress actually asserted (as 
opposed to what it could have asserted using the same words had the 
arguments, debates, and legislative history been different).  Had Justice 
Scalia been a deferentialist rather than an originalist, his central thesis 
would have been that in adopting the text, “[A]ny person who . . . uses or 
carries a firearm [in the course of committing a crime of violence or drug 
trafficking], shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such [a] 
crime . . . be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than five 
years . . . ,”12 Congress stipulated that the use of a firearm as a weapon (or 
carrying it for that purpose) is subject to additional punishment.  This, I 
believe, is what both he and the Court would have concluded, had not he, 
and they, confused the meaning of that sentence with what it was used to 
assert or stipulate.13 
My next illustration of the first task of deferentialist interpretation—
discovering original asserted or stipulated content—is the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, copied and applied 
to the states in the Fourteenth Amendment.  It reads, “No person shall . . . 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”14 
The clause presents an interpretive problem.  One can understand English 
perfectly well without knowing its content, and hence without knowing 
what rights it guarantees.  This is not because the words “life,” “liberty,” or 
“property” have undergone substantial changes in ordinary meaning.  They 
have not.15  The main source of interpretive unclarity is the phrase “due 
process of law.”  Even here, no individual word is unclear.  Moreover, the 
phrase has a literal meaning—roughly without the process to which, by law, 
one is due.  But one cannot rely on this meaning alone without rendering 
the guarantee vacuous, which neither it nor the rest of the Bill of Rights 
were.  On the contrary, the Due Process Clause made an important 
contribution to the guarantees demanded by the people of thirteen newly 
independent states, who were nothing if not jealous of their rights and 
suspicious of any central authority that might transgress them.16  The 
interpretive task is to discover the presupposed understanding of the process 
to which the people were widely believed to be entitled, that the language of 
the Fifth Amendment was used to express. 
To discover the substance of this presupposed understanding of the 
framers and ratifiers of the Fifth Amendment, and later of the Fourteenth, 
 
 12. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006). 
 13. See Stephen Neale, On Location, in SITUATING SEMANTICS:  ESSAYS ON THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN PERRY 251 (Michael O’Rourke & Corey Washington eds., 2007); see 
also Soames, supra note 1, at 237–41. 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 15. See, e.g., WILLIAM PERRY, THE ROYAL STANDARD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 575 (1st 
Am. ed. 1788) (defining life as “enjoyment or possession of terrestrial existence”); id. at 573 
(defining liberty as “a power to do as one thinks fit; unless restrained by the law of the land” 
(emphasis omitted)); id. at 773 (defining property as the “right which one hath to lands or 
tenements, goods or chattels, which no way depend on another man’s curtesy”). 
 16. See generally Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process As 
Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1721–26 (2012). 
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requires historical research.  Much of this has been done by Nathan S. 
Chapman and Michael W. McConnell of the Stanford University Law 
School in their recent paper, Due Process As Separation of Powers.17  The 
short version of their story begins in 1215 with a provision in Chapter 29 of 
the Magna Carta, stating, in effect, that the King may not deprive a subject 
of his rights under existing law without adjudication by an independent 
judicial body.18  By 1354, this idea was expressed in a statute in which the 
application of existing law by a judicial body was summed up in the phrase 
“due process of law.”19  In 1628, Parliament passed the Petition of Right, 
which stated that subjects could be deprived of rights only according to 
what is described variously as “the Law of the Land,” “due process[] of 
Law[],” or “by the lawful[] Judgment of his Peer[s].”20  Chapman and 
McConnell sum up the lesson as follows: 
Each of these phrases was a way of expressing the same two institutional 
checks on the King’s power to deprive persons of rights:  only pursuant to 
positive law (common law or parliamentary statute) and only after 
judgment by a common law court.  The “substantive” side of due process 
was positive, standing law; the “procedural” side was adjudication by a 
court. . . .  When [Sir John Selden] Coke stated in a later commentary that 
Chapter 29’s “law of the land” was equivalent to the phrase “due process 
of law”—the commentary relied on by early Americans to equate the two 
constitutional guarantees—he was summarizing these two aspects of the 
rule of the common law . . . .21 
From the end of the English Civil War through the late eighteenth 
century, Parliament gained power as the supreme arbiter of the law of the 
land.22  By the 1770s, Parliament was not itself seen, except by a small 
number of Whig members of Parliament and their American supporters, to 
be lacking in power to deprive subjects of rights as it saw fit, without 
submitting to common law procedures.23  However, there was a movement 
to restrict the procedures it employed when acting judicially.24  This effort 
was taken further in the American colonies, where it was increasingly 
argued, including by the First Continental Congress, that Parliament itself 
had violated the law of the land—due process—in passing the Boston Port 
Act, the Massachusetts Act, and the Coercive Acts in 1774—these acts 
deprived colonists of jury trials in certain cases, and revoked other rights 
originally granted in the charter of the colony.25 
In the 1780s, the constitutions of American states had established 
separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers, and courts were 
declining to enforce legislative acts deemed to operate retrospectively, or to 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 1682. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 1687–88. 
 21. Id. (citation omitted). 
 22. Id. at 1692–93. 
 23. Id. at 1694. 
 24. Id. at 1693–94. 
 25. Id. at 1699–1701. 
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decide essentially judicial matters without benefit of trial.26  In 1787, 
Alexander Hamilton argued that ex post facto laws against Loyalists 
violated “due process of law” in his Remarks on an Act for Regulating 
Elections made to New York State’s General Assembly.27  His rebuke was 
not that the legislation violated fundamental rights, but that it usurped a 
properly judicial function, and so deprived persons of procedural rights that 
a judicial process guarantees.28 
This was the understanding of “due process of law” shared by the 
Framers of the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights.29  The guarantee that 
one would not be deprived of certain rights without due process was the 
guarantee that one would not be stripped of them without being charged 
with violating a constitutionally legitimate law in an independent judicial 
proceeding, with all the safeguards inherent in such a process.30  The rights 
protected were not unrestricted, unenumerated rights, but specific rights 
having to do with life, liberty, and property.31  The idea is illustrated by 
liberty, which was taken to be a natural right to act as one chooses so long 
as it is not contrary to established law.32  The Constitution and Bill of 
Rights, along with state constitutions, restricted such law by putting certain 
activities, including exercise of freedom of speech, press, and religion, 
beyond its reach.33  It was also understood that to pass muster, legislation 
must be general, rather than specific in application, and prospective rather 
than retrospective.34  Other unmentioned aspects of natural liberty—like the 
right to travel, to work, to contract for goods and labor, to marry and raise a 
family, etc.—were taken for granted as instances of liberty that could not be 
deprived without a proper judicial procedure.35  However, no restrictions 
were placed on the degree to which these natural rights could be regulated 
by legislation.36  What the Fifth Amendment guaranteed was that one 
would not be deprived of any of these rights without a judicial proceeding 
pursuant to positive law.37 
There was no significant change in this understanding when the Due 
Process Clause was included in the Fourteenth Amendment.38  As Chapman 
and McConnell argue, antebellum state courts had used due process 
concerns, though not, of course, the Fifth Amendment, against legislative 
acts that abrogated procedural protections of common law, or deprived 
persons of liberty or vested property rights.  But the grounds for these 
 
 26. Id. at 1704–06. 
 27. Id. at 1714–15. 
 28. Id. at 1714–16. 
 29. Id. at 1715. 
 30. Id. at 1715–16. 
 31. Id. at 1780–81. 
 32. Id. at 1781. 
 33. Id. at 1736. 
 34. See id. at 1727, 1731–33. 
 35. Id. at 1680, 1735–36. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 1726. 
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decisions were that legislatures had performed essentially “judicial acts” 
that usurped the role of the courts, thereby violating separation of powers 
and due process.39  The Supreme Court’s first major Due Process Clause 
decision came in 1855 in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & 
Improvement Co.40  At issue in this case was a law passed by Congress 
authorizing executive branch officers in the Treasury Department to seize 
private property as a means of recovering money owed without judicial 
warrant or jury trial.41  In this case, they placed a lien on the property.42  
The Court ruled, in accordance with what was by then the traditional 
understanding of the separation of governmental powers, that due process 
required either the use of traditional common law judicial procedures or an 
alternative procedure providing the defendant with equivalent procedural 
guarantees.43  In so ruling, the Court stated that the Due Process Clause 
restricted Congress’s ability “to make any process ‘due process of law’ by 
its mere will,” and identified the processes to be observed as those required 
by other constitutional provisions and by the “settled usages and modes of 
proceeding existing in the common and statu[t]e law of England, before the 
emigration of our ancestors”44—in effect, by the traditional procedures of 
common law.45 
The history I have cited is merely a sample of the richer and more 
detailed account provided by Chapman and McConnell, who maintain that 
the original understanding of the Due Process Clause did not change when 
it was included in the Fourteenth Amendment and applied to the states.46  
Until the late nineteenth century, it was taken to state that:  (1) no rights 
involving life, liberty, and property may be deprived without protection of a 
judicial process conforming to the separation of powers doctrine or to the 
traditional procedures of common law; (2) among those rights are those 
explicitly noted in the Constitution, which cannot be abrogated by the 
legislature; and (3) while other traditional rights can be modified by 
legislative acts, such acts must be distinguished from judicial acts as being 
general rather than specific in application, and forward looking rather than 
retrospective.47 
This discussion illustrates the first dimension of Deferentialism—
identification of legal content—by showing how it applies to an important 
and disputed constitutional provision.  It also provides background for the 
second dimension of Deferentialism—rectification—which specifies the 
rationale for when and how judicial resolution of a case may, correctly, 
change the content of the law or laws being applied.  Rectification begins 
 
 39. See id. at 1726–27. 
 40. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855). 
 41. Id. at 274. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 275–77. 
 44. Id. at 277. 
 45. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 16, at 1774–75. 
 46. See id. at 1726. 
 47. See id. at 1680, 1735–36. 
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where identification leaves off.  According to Deferentialism, the content of 
a legal provision can no more be identified with the meanings of the 
sentences in the text, or with the lawmakers’ policy goals in adopting it, 
than the contents we assert in ordinary life can be identified with the 
linguistic meanings of the sentences we use, or with our conversational 
goals in using them.  The contents of laws also cannot be identified with 
normative idealizations of what the lawmakers said or stipulated, including 
what they would have stipulated had they known relevant facts.  Legal 
content is determined in essentially the same way that the asserted or 
stipulated contents of ordinary texts are, though it is important to note that:  
(1) since the paradigmatic aim of legal speech is authoritative stipulation, 
its natural counterparts include ordinary commands, firm requests, or 
action-guiding directions, rather than cooperative exchanges of information; 
and (2) legal stipulations must be understood in the context of complex 
systems of previous stipulations. 
This naturalistic, non-normative conception of the contents of legal texts 
and performances leads, inevitably, to the process of rectification that no 
realistic theory of authoritative judicial action can afford to ignore.  If the 
existing laws are what various legally authoritative actors have said or 
stipulated, then legal contents resulting from those assertions and 
stipulations can be just as vague and indeterminate, as conflicting and 
contradictory, and as ill-suited to furthering the goals for which the 
assertions or stipulations were made as the contents of ordinary texts and 
other linguistic performances.  When ordinary speakers leave crucial 
contingencies unaddressed, when they unwittingly undertake inconsistent 
commitments, or when what they advocate transparently defeats the goals 
of their advocacy, we do not pretend that Beneficent Providence has filled 
every gap, removed every contradiction, and rationalized every linguistic 
performance. 
The same is true in the law.  When the assertive or stipulated contents 
adopted by legal actors are indeterminate, when they are contradictory or 
inconsistent with other legal provisions, or when they are self-defeating in 
particular applications, we should not pretend that Beneficent Providence 
has rescued the legislation by transubstantiating the lawmakers’ flawed 
performance into a determinate, consistent, rationalized, and morally 
acceptable product.  There is no such transcendental legal product.  In these 
situations, existing legal contents are either indeterminate and thus provide 
no answers in adjudications that require one; inconsistent and thus provide 
conflicting answers; or self-defeating and thus provide only answers that 
subvert the publically expressed rationales offered in their support and for 
which they were adopted.  In these circumstances, the task of the judge is 
not to discover an idealized law that is already there; it is to make new law.  
The challenge of Deferentialism is to articulate what form of deference to 
original, or at any rate antecedent, sources should guide this process. 
The first type of rectification is precisification.  This is what is needed 
when the asserted or stipulative content of a legal provision is vague, and 
facts crucial to the resolution of the case fall within the range of this 
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vagueness.  In these circumstances, no determinate verdict is entailed by the 
facts plus the preexisting legal content.  Deferentialism maintains that in 
such cases, the court’s duty is to adopt the minimum principled 
precisification of the indeterminate existing content that allows a definite 
verdict to be reached that most closely conforms to the original lawmakers’ 
rationale for adopting the legal provision.48  By “rationale,” I do not, of 
course, mean the causally efficacious motives that led them to act, which 
are often epistemically inscrutable and constitutively irrelevant.  In addition 
to being private and difficult to discern, motives are as individual and 
various as the actors themselves.  Attempts to aggregate them and identify 
the dominant motivators are at best speculative and at worst invitations to 
disguised judicial policymaking.  A law’s rationale consists not of the 
causally efficacious motives of lawmakers, but of the chief reasons publicly 
offered to justify and explain the law’s adoption.  This is what is worthy of 
deference, as well as being epistemically discernable in most cases.49 
This is not to say that a law’s rationale might not itself be vague.  It often 
is.50  But this will not affect its utility in resolving a case in which the facts 
place the case in the indeterminate range of the content of the law as 
enacted, unless those facts also happen to fall in the indeterminate range of 
the publically stated reasons for it.  Often, this will not be so.  And when it 
is, what then?  Here, the legally authorized interpreter, often a court, must 
look at the contents of, and rationales for, the body of surrounding laws into 
which the original law fits.  As before, the aim is to craft the minimum 
principled precisification of the indeterminate content of the original law 
that allows a definite verdict to be reached.  What is new is that the 
precisification sought is the one that most closely conforms to a composite 
of the original rationales of potentially several laws, in addition to the one 
explicitly at issue in the case.  Since the process is not algorithmic, it 
requires judgment, and so is open to abuse.  But the point of a deferentialist 
conception of judicial action and authority is not to prevent abuse, which no 
reasonable conception can do.  The point is to lay down justifiable 
principles for guiding and evaluating the inevitable exercise of judicial 
judgment. 
The lawmakers’ rationale for adopting a legal provision is also crucial for 
another kind of judicial rectification in which correct adjudication changes 
the law being applied.  This sort of rectification involves harmonizing 
several equally authoritative laws that bear on the facts of a case in opposite 
ways, with the result that inconsistent verdicts are entailed by the contents 
 
 48. See Scott Soames, Vagueness and the Law, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 95, 99–107 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012); Scott Soames, What Vagueness 
and Inconsistency Tell Us About Interpretation, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 31, 42–44, 51–57 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011) 
[hereinafter Soames, Vagueness and Inconsistency]. 
 49. For an illustration of this point, see Soames, supra note 1, at 250–51 (applying 
Deferentialism to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act); see also Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 50. See Soames, Vagueness and Inconsistency, supra note 48, at 37. 
606 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
of the laws plus the relevant facts.  When this happens, the judge is required 
to fashion the minimal modification of existing laws that removes the 
inconsistency and allows a unique verdict to be reached, while maximizing 
the fulfillment of the discernable legislative rationales of the laws in 
question.  Again, Deferentialism demands deference both to the original 
rationale of the legislation and to its original, though problematic, legal 
content—which is to be preserved to the maximum extent possible, 
consistent with eliminating inconsistency. 
Harmonization also occurs when the facts of a particular case generate an 
inconsistency not between the contents of different statutes, but between the 
content of a single law and the transparent rationale for which it, or related 
laws, were adopted.  In these cases, the law as it exists plus unanticipated 
facts of the case entail an unforeseen result that fails to conform to, and may 
even subvert, the purposes for which it was approved.  In such cases, the 
deferentialist is again required to minimally modify the content of existing 
law, while maximizing the fulfillment of the discernable legislative 
rationale.51 
Since judicial rectification legitimately makes law in all three of these 
types of situations, judges are themselves lawmakers.  Thus, their assertive 
stipulations constitute new legal contents to be discerned by other judges in 
future cases.  In addition, the stated rationales for their decisions provide 
grist for further processes of rectification when initial judicial stipulations 
are vague, when they conflict with other authoritative legal contents, or 
when literally applying them to subsequent, unanticipated facts subverts 
their original rationales. 
With this in mind, I turn to some well-known “substantive due process” 
decisions that appear to be at variance with the original legal content of the 
clause they interpret.  The questions at issue are:  (1) whether the changes in 
the understanding of due process in these cases are justified by a 
deferentialist understanding of how correct interpretation can change legal 
content; and (2) whether, if they are not so justified, this casts doubt on the 
decisions, or on Deferentialism itself. 
Pride of place in the string of well-known post–Fourteenth Amendment 
cases that changed the law of due process goes to Lochner v. New York in 
1905.52  In this case, the Supreme Court struck down a statute limiting the 
hours per day and days per week worked by bakers on the grounds that it 
deprived them and their employers of liberty without due process of law.53  
The liberty in question was freedom of contract.54  According to the Court, 
“the general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the 
liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”55  
Although the Court recognized that states have the right to prohibit certain 
 
 51. See Soames, supra note 1, at 244–59 (arguing that this special kind of legislation by 
harmonization plays a unique role in much constitutional interpretation). 
 52. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 53. Id. at 64. 
 54. Id. at 53. 
 55. Id. 
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kinds of contracts in the name of safety, health, morals, and general welfare, 
such prohibitions must pass certain tests.  Which tests those were depended 
on which justice’s opinion one read—ranging from the necessity of the 
prohibition to attain the desired end,56 to its reasonableness,57 to whether 
the contract right interfered with was what a “rational and fair man” would 
regard as a fundamental right.58 
The reasoning behind, and substance of, this application of the Due 
Process Clause were new, and with the coming of the New Deal, were short 
lived.59  How did the Lochner decision square with a deferentialist 
understanding of the clause?  The fact that the decision changed the content 
of the constitutional provision does not itself condemn it, provided that the 
change was a proper instance of rectification, which it was not.  Under 
Deferentialism, due process does restrict constitutionally permissible 
legislation, but not by enumerating substantive rights such as freedom of 
speech, of the press, of association, and of religion, enumerated elsewhere 
in the Bill of Rights.  Unlike enumerated rights, the Due Process Clause, 
together with the general constitutional scheme defining the separation of 
powers, only requires that any legislation limiting unenumerated traditional 
rights be distinguished from judicial acts in being general rather than 
specific, and forward looking rather than retrospective, in application.60  
Since the right of freedom of contract required by Lochner is not 
enumerated in the Constitution, while the legislation struck down by the 
Court was, by its generality and prospectiveness, clearly not judicial in 
nature, the decision was clearly invalid by deferentialist standards, no 
matter what one may think of its merits or demerits as substantive social 
policy.61 
Although Lochner is not popular today, it is possible to defend it using a 
kind of reasoning, which though significantly aprioristic, does have some 
contemporary currency.  One begins by observing that the specific rights 
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution and Bill of Rights are fundamental 
rights.  Next, one reasons that, surely, they are not the only fundamental 
rights.  Since it is not plausible to suppose that the Founders thought 
otherwise, one continues by imagining that they wished—or by supposing 
that they should rationally have wished—that these other rights would also 
be constitutionally protected, while realizing that they themselves could not 
be expected to enumerate them all.  Having gotten this far, one asks, “How 
might a rational Framer of the Constitution accomplish this?”—to which 
one answers “By inserting a vague, catch-all clause in the Bill of Rights to 
 
 56. Id. at 68 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 57. Id. at 58 (majority opinion). 
 58. Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 59. See generally W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (repudiating 
Lochner). 
 60. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 16, at 1680, 1735–36. 
 61. For an interesting and well-reasoned defense of the Court’s decision in Lochner 
against various nondeferentialist charges, see DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING 
LOCHNER (2011). 
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cover the multiplicity of fundamental rights that future interpreters may 
discover.”  This, the story goes, is the role played by the right to liberty—in 
the trio “life, liberty, and property” of the Due Process Clause.62 
Of course, it is understood—and this part of the reasoning is historically 
accurate—that in saying that rights may not be deprived without due 
process of law, the Framers were saying two things:  (1) that in order to 
deprive persons of their liberty (or other rights), those persons must be 
afforded the protections of a judicial proceeding in which the deprivation is 
judged to be in accordance with positive law; and (2) that the law itself 
must be legitimate.63  The invention, in this Lochnerian defense, is its claim 
that in order for a law to be legitimate, it is not sufficient that the law not 
infringe any of the rights explicitly guaranteed in the Constitution and Bill 
of Rights, as well as being general rather than specific, and prospective 
rather than retrospective, in application.  In addition, the law must not 
infringe any unenumerated fundamental right that the justices “discover.”64 
To turn this into a defense of Lochner, one would have to claim that a 
virtually unfettered right of contract is a fundamental right, which few today 
are willing to do.  But putting Lochner and the right of contract aside, this 
form of constitutional reasoning, in which the Due Process Clause serves as 
an all-purpose catchall for unenumerated rights, is quite general—as I will 
illustrate by discussing a lengthening line of more recent cases that 
exemplify it.65  The point to be made here is that this form of reasoning is 
not deferentialist.  To take it to be so, one would have to argue that the 
framers and ratifiers of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments understood 
and announced in the public rationale offered on behalf of the amendments 
that the Due Process Clause was an intentionally vague, tabula rasa on 
which future interpreters could write what they wished.  Obviously, the 
framers and ratifiers did no such thing. 
Nor would it have made sense for them to do so.  The key to the Due 
Process Clause is not the enumeration of rights the deprivation of which 
require due process of law, but rather the specification of those processes of 
law that are sufficient to deprive persons of the rights in question.66  Other 
provisions of the Bill of Rights enumerate rights that are not to be deprived 
or diminished by any legislative or executive action.67  The function of the 
Due Process Clause is to provide judicial protection for deprivations of 
rights that are constitutionally proper subjects of legislative and executive 
action.68 
 
 62. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  For an account of how the notion of “natural 
rights” informed legal interpretation of the Due Process Clause in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, see BERNSTEIN, supra note 61, at 17–20. 
 63. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 16, at 1735–36. 
 64. See id. at 1792–94. 
 65. See infra notes 69–98 and accompanying text. 
 66. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 16, at 1735–36. 
 67. See id. at 1736. 
 68. See id. 
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The modern cases I will examine for their departure from Deferentialism 
are Griswold v. Connecticut,69 Roe v. Wade,70 Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,71 and Lawrence v. Texas.72  These 
cases mark the return of unenumerated, fundamental rights, buttressed in 
the end by an explicit appeal to due process.73  This time, the rights in 
question were not public economic rights, which have long been politically 
subordinated to the vastly expanded power of federal and state 
governments.  Instead, they are private rights having to do with personal 
sexual morality, the traditional restrictions on which, though not without 
expression in law, had their sources in religious and other private cultural 
institutions, rather than in the economy or the state.74  This difference, 
which is by no means accidental, is interesting.  Why should it matter, in 
the search for unenumerated fundamental rights, whether the rights concern 
public and economic behavior or matters of private, personal morality?  
Since Deferentialism recognizes no such significant difference, while the 
modern cases insist on one,75 it is clear that these cases are not guided by 
any version of Deferentialism.  It is, therefore, left to nondeferentialist 
defenders of these cases to explain why new, judicially “discovered,” 
fundamental rights should occur in one narrow range of human activity, but 
not in others.  Here, I will concentrate less on which “rights” have found 
favor and more on the argumentative structure of the revival of Lochner-
style constitutional reasoning. 
Griswold was a vital precursor of the other cases discussed below, both 
in opening up a trove of supposedly fundamental rights not explicitly 
mentioned in the Constitution, and in taking economic rights off the table 
by declaring—with dubious relevance—that the Court would not “sit as a 
super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that 
touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions.”76  In this 
way, the Court endorsed the New Deal repudiation of Lochner while 
simultaneously reviving Lochner-style constitutional reasoning in a domain 
of human life in which it felt confident about the moral and political 
correctness of its super-legislative judgments.77 
The linchpin of the case was the supposed discovery of a general right of 
privacy discernable from “penumbras, formed by emanations” of the First 
Amendment right of association, the Third Amendment right not to have 
soldiers quartered in one’s home, the Fourth Amendment right against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, and the Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination.78  The problem, of course, is that although these rights 
 
 69. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 70. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 71. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 72. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 73. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564; Casey, 505 U.S. at 846–48. 
 74. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571. 
 75. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). 
 76. See id. (emphasis added). 
 77. See also Chapman & McConnell, supra note 16, at 1797–98. 
 78. Id. at 484. 
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are genuinely guaranteed, there is no epistemically legitimate inference 
from which a general right to privacy encompassing matters of sexual 
morality such as contraception (which was at issue in Griswold) can be 
derived.  On the contrary, Justice Douglas’s “penumbras” and “emanations” 
were simply camouflage for a nondeferentialist doctrine that, in 1965, dare 
not speak its name.79 
Roe v. Wade,80 which followed Griswold in 1973, was braver than 
Griswold.  As in the earlier case, the Court in Roe relied on a protected right 
of privacy.81  However, unlike its reasoning in Griswold, the Court did not 
seek to derive the right of privacy from penumbras formed from 
emanations, or in any other way, including any appeal to long-standing 
tradition, as was attempted in the Harlan concurrence in Griswold82 (which 
could not possibly have worked in Roe).  Rather, it simply invoked stare 
decisis on the basis of the eight year-old decision that had struck down a 
law in one state that was not then being enforced anyway.83  This “settled 
law” was the ground for vastly extending the right of privacy invented in 
Griswold to a much more problematic domain, thereby striking down the 
laws—some quite recent and many allowing abortion in certain 
circumstances—of all fifty states.  In sum, the decision was reached by 
Lochner-style reasoning from the premise of Griswold privacy. 
This time, the Court did not suggest, by irrelevant declaration, that it was 
not acting as a super-legislature.  This new reticence was a step forward, 
since the tautological claim that in ruling on a noneconomic case the Court 
was not acting (improperly) as a super-legislature on economic matters did 
nothing to show that it was not, in fact, acting (improperly) as a super-
legislature on other matters.  If the Court had essentially nothing new to say 
about why its Lochnerian reasoning was acceptable, and the reasoning in 
Lochner was not acceptable, silence—throughout a great many pages—may 
have been the best policy.  The effect of Roe was to deliver the nakedly 
nondeferentialist punch thrown by the nakedly nondeferentialist Griswold. 
 
 79. Justice Harlan’s concurrence offered a different rationale. See id. at 499–502 
(Harlan, J., concurring); see also Chapman & McConnell, supra note 16, at 1796.  Instead of 
attempting to derive a general right of privacy from Justice Douglas’s enumerated rights, 
Justice Harlan judged the then moribund Connecticut statute prohibiting the sale of 
contraceptives to a married couple to violate a liberty—covered by the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment—traditionally afforded to married couples. See Griswold, 381 
U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).  Though this justification is certainly superior to Justice 
Douglas’s, it still fails to pass deferentialist muster, since traditional common law liberty 
does not trump legislative enactments in a deferentialist understanding of due process. 
 80. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 81. See id. at 152–53. 
 82. 381 U.S. at 499–502 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 83. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152–54.  While Roe cites additional cases as sources of 
particularized privacy rights, Griswold is key to the Court’s justification because it asserts a 
general right of privacy. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482–86.  The Court implicitly invokes 
stare decisis by accepting as true that this line of cases, with Griswold at its center, 
establishes a “right of privacy,” before determining that it “is broad enough to encompass a 
woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” Roe, 410 U.S. at 152–53. 
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The question in the next case, Casey,84 was whether the state could, 
without violating a woman’s right to an abortion under Roe, require her (in 
nonemergency cases) to (among other things) give her informed consent to 
the procedure, to wait twenty-four hours, and, if a minor, to obtain the 
consent of a parent (with the possibility of a judicial bypass).85  The Court 
ruled five-to-four to uphold Roe, but accepted those of the state’s 
restrictions that, neither in their purpose nor in their effect, placed an 
“undue burden” on or a “substantial obstacle” in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion (which the Court ruled most, but not all, of the state’s 
restrictions did not do).86  Having put itself at the center of what, prior to 
Roe, had always been a legislative matter in the states, there was no way, 
short of repudiating Roe, of freeing the Court from having to make further 
legislative decisions about which details of new state legislation represented 
wise, or at least reasonable, trade-offs—here expressed in terms of the 
hopelessly vague distinction between burdens that are “undue” versus those 
that are not, and obstacles that are “substantial” versus those that are not.87  
Despite this vagueness, the message both to voters and to the states was 
clear:  nothing having to do with abortion is up to you anymore; you may do 
only what we in the future decide you may do.  With messages like these 
sent to a population raised to revere self-government, it is not hard to 
understand why the politics of abortion in the United States became so 
poisonous. 
Beyond reaffirming Roe, the notably new element was the way in which 
the Court attempted to justify the decisions in this line of cases as legitimate 
substantive interpretations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.88  Without repudiating the generalized right to privacy 
asserted in Griswold and Roe, the Court took “the controlling word in the 
cases before us” to be “liberty,” thereby bringing the Due Process Clause 
directly into play.89  Privacy was, in effect, subsumed under liberty as a 
special case, with the Court asserting that its “obligation is to define the 
liberty of all.”90  As for a definition, the nearest we get is the plurality’s 
astounding assertion that “at the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s 
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery 
of human life.”91  This is classic Lochner-style reasoning dressed up in 
contemporary pseudophilosophical form—with an utterly vague, subjective, 
and general conception of liberty serving as a placeholder into which the 
justices may insert whatever new fundamental rights they themselves  
discern, whether or not the supposed rights are derivable from explicit 
constitutional texts, embedded in tradition, or even enjoy a current national 
 
 84. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
 85. Id. at 844. 
 86. Id. at 877. 
 87. See id. 
 88. See id. at 846. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 850. 
 91. Id. at 851. 
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consensus.  In this way, the Due Process Clause was made into one of the 
Court’s leading legislative enablers. 
Anticipating objections to this judicial blank check, the Court in Casey 
conceded that “a literal reading” of the Due Process Clause might suggest 
that “it governs only the procedures by which a State may deprive persons 
of liberty.”92  But it quickly adds that this cannot be so because “for at least 
105 years . . . the Clause has been understood to contain a substantive 
component as well.”93  Really?  What do we find 105 years prior to Casey?  
The case cited by the Court is Mugler v. Kansas,94 which initiated the 
economic substantive due process line of cases leading to Lochner.95  So 
the doctrine that begins with Griswold’s enthusiastic endorsement of the 
long-standing repudiation of economic due process cases like Lochner—
and the Court’s pious, but unsupported, suggestion that Griswold is to be 
sharply distinguished from them—is first extended in Roe, and later ratified 
and cast in due process terms in Casey.  There, substantive due process is 
articulated, given full expression, and defended by appealing to the 
supposedly 105-year-old validity of the long-repudiated Lochner line.  
Whatever else this may be, it is not a coherent defense of the Court’s 
nondeferentialist practice. 
The final case in this line that I will mention is Lawrence v. Texas,96 in 
which the Court invalidated a Texas statute against consensual homosexual 
sex.97  The case is significant mainly as further entrenchment of the 
evolving substantive due process doctrine arising from Griswold, Roe, and 
Casey.  As in Roe and Casey, the Court simply asserts its undefined and 
seemingly unlimited power to define for all the fundamental rights it wishes 
to put beyond the reach of democratic politics at any level of government.98  
If one thinks that the Supreme Court is, or should be, a super-legislature 
with the power to invalidate legislation in any manner it wishes, then one 
may plausibly defend its decision in Lawrence on the grounds that the result 
reached is not only good but would probably be supported by most citizens.  
However, if one thinks that the Court in our system of government is not, 
and should not be, a super-legislature, then one must judge its essentially 
legislative actions in Griswold, Roe, Casey, and Lawrence to have exceeded 
its legal authority, even though the policy results achieved were sometimes 
good.  My own conclusions are (1) that Lochner, Griswold, Roe, Casey, and 
Lawrence cannot be given deferentialist justifications, and (2) that the 
Supreme Court has produced no other coherent justifications for them. 
What kind of justification should we be looking for, not just for 
individual decisions, but for Deferentialism itself?  The justification I am 
most concerned with is descriptive.  When legal interpretation is understood 
 
 92. Id. at 846. 
 93. Id. (citation omitted). 
 94. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
 95. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 16, at 1798. 
 96. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 97. Id. at 578. 
 98. See id. at 564. 
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as the application of law to the facts of particular cases by authorized legal 
actors, one expects the task to be governed by legal rules that determine the 
responsibilities of those charged with it.  Although legal rules are 
normative, the claim that a particular set of such norms is taken by citizens 
and holders of public offices to be legally authoritative is descriptive.  It is 
just such deeply and commonly accepted norms that, at bottom, constitute 
the authority of any system of laws.  The descriptive questions to which I 
seek answers are:  (1) What are the legal obligations of judges, justices, and 
others charged with applying the law to particular cases in the United 
States?  (2) Does the deferentialist conception properly characterize them?  
(3) How do other conceptions of the legal obligations of those applying the 
law to particular cases compare with it? 
My schematic answer to the first question is that courts are not to 
legislate, but are to apply laws adopted by the legislature to facts of 
particular cases.  To do so, they must determine what the lawmakers 
stipulated in adopting the relevant texts and apply that content to the facts 
of the case.  When this fails to determine a unique, acceptable legal 
outcome—either because the legal content leads to inconsistent outcomes, 
or because it fails to lead to any outcome, or because it leads to an 
unforeseen outcome that subverts the predominant legislative rationale of 
the lawmakers in adopting the relevant laws—the task of the judge is to 
fashion the minimal modification of existing legal content that removes the 
deficiency and allows a decision to be reached, while maximizing the 
fulfillment of that rationale.  If this is roughly correct, then so is 
deferentialist legal interpretation.  Is it correct?  Surely, something 
approximating it has been the dominant understanding of the educated 
portion of the populace throughout most of the history of the United States.  
Though that consensus has diminished among the political elites in the last 
half century, adherence to this conception is, I think, still widespread. 
There is, to be sure, a decades-old strain of nondeferentialist decisions in 
courts at all levels.99  This could not be so were there not substantial 
opposition to Deferentialism among legal professionals, legal theorists, 
journalists, and politicians.  But it is not obvious to what extent support for 
these decisions is result oriented, and to what extent it reflects genuine 
opposition to a deferentialist conception of the proper role of the judiciary.  
Consider a common form of argument:  it begins with the claim that it is 
 
 99. In addition to the cases discussed above, supra notes 69–98 and accompanying text, 
this nondeferentialist tendency can be seen in other lines of cases.  One example is the “one 
man, one vote” cases. See Avery v. Midland Cnty., 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Lucas v. Forty-
Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 
(1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).  
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Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Wallace 
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vitally urgent that the country address some issue.  It is then claimed that 
political institutions have proven unable to accomplish what needs to be 
done because they are deadlocked.  So, it is argued, courts must do the job 
by ruling a certain way, even though there is no deferentialist justification 
for so ruling. 
It is important to notice that, in itself, this is not an argument against the 
descriptive claim that the legal responsibilities of judges are as 
Deferentialism defines them.  They may be so defined, even if sometimes it 
is morally better for judges to do what they are not legally authorized to do.  
Although this may sound unfamiliar, it should not be shocking.  It is not 
shocking because virtually any position, short of being an absolute ruler, 
carries with it limitations on one’s authority.  Because of this, 
circumstances can arise in which the morally best thing to do exceeds one’s 
authority.  This can happen with judges as much as with those in other 
positions.  But if it does happen, a judge cannot very well admit it, since 
quite apart from the penalties the judge would face, a public admission of 
what amounts to illegally achieving a desired legal result, would, in many 
cases, invalidate, or at least undermine, that very result.  Consequently, one 
cannot expect judges who are willing to violate their authority in order to 
achieve “a higher good,” or commentators who wish to aid them, to speak 
forthrightly about what they are doing.  This explains the unfamiliarity with 
what would otherwise be an obvious point.  The mere fact that some 
morally or politically good results cannot be, or could not have been, 
achieved by deferentialist justices does not show that Deferentialism is an 
incorrect account of the legal responsibilities of those now, or in the past, 
charged with applying the law to the facts of particular cases. 
The activist argument is not even a normative argument against 
Deferentialism—unless one can show that a better workable system is 
possible in which no constraints on what judges are legally authorized to do 
could ever prevent them from reaching a morally optimal result in a 
particular case.  Absent such an unlikely showing, the argument that 
sometimes judges should arrive at nondeferentialist results fails to 
demonstrate that the deferentialist conception of the role of the judiciary is 
not normatively optimal, let alone that it is not descriptively correct. 
To argue against Deferentialism, one needs to specify a competing 
conception of judicial responsibility.  One such antideferentialist 
conception might naturally begin by admitting that lower courts—as well as 
the Executive and the Legislature—are legally required to follow higher 
court rulings in an essentially deferentialist manner.  Of course, the 
Supreme Court would not be so restricted.  Like the old British House of 
Lords, it might be granted the power to void any legislation bearing on 
cases brought before it.100  Moreover, it might be maintained that when 
considering the law in a case, the Court is free to alter its content for 
whatever moral or political reasons it finds compelling, taking account of 
 
 100. See GARY SLAPPER & DAVID KELLY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 71–72 (9th ed. 
2009). 
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the need to maintain stability and consistency in the laws, and to render 
their application reasonably predictable. 
The chief difference between this antideferentialist conception of the role 
of the judiciary and the deferentialist conception is that the former grants 
vast legislative authority to the Supreme Court that the latter denies.  In this, 
I believe the deferentialist conception more closely approximates 
descriptive adequacy concerning accepted legal norms in the United States 
than does the alternative.  My reasons are: 
(1) Deferentialism better reflects the fundamental importance of the 
separation of powers in the history of the United States than anti-
Deferentialism does. 
(2) Although there have been many nondeferentialist decisions, they 
have not generally been accompanied by articulations of an 
antideferentialist conception of the role of the judiciary.  Why, if the 
governing conception of that role is really antideferentialist, have courts not 
been forthright in stating their rationales?  Judges and justices almost never 
say they are legislating their own political or moral views, but rather claim 
to derive their antideferentialist results from old, accepted, and authoritative 
principles.101  In so doing, they implicitly acknowledge that the 
deferentialist conception they seek to undermine is the governing 
conception from which their authority derives. 
(3) The very incoherence of the changing and conflicting justifications 
given by the Supreme Court in Griswold, Roe, and Casey is itself a 
reflection of justices who know their authority derives from a deferentialist 
ideal that they, as a body, do not share.  That they do not share it is a blow 
to the authority of Deferentialism.  But they do not, as a body, share any 
articulated competing view either.  The authority of Deferentialism cannot 
be replaced until a compelling alternative is articulated and embraced by the 
most widely known and respected legal and political figures.  This has not 
happened. 
(4)  The appointment of judges, their tenure, and their code of conduct 
reflect the nonpolitical nature of legal responsibilities of deferentialist 
judging, rather than the political character of antideferentialist 
“interpretation.”  Federal judges are appointed, not elected;102 during their 
appointment hearings, they are excused from answering questions on issues 
that might come before them in order to preserve their neutrality;103 their 
code of conduct restricts political activities and requires recusal in various 
 
 101. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
 102. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Judicial Nominations and Confirmations, U.S. 
SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/nominations/
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 103. See, e.g., The Nomination of Judge Sandra Day O’Connor of Arizona To Serve As an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:  Hearings Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 57–58 (1981) (statement of Sandra Day O’Connor) (“I do not 
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come before the Court . . . .  Such a statement by me as to how I might resolve a particular 
issue or what I might do in a future Court action might make it necessary for me to 
disqualify myself on the matter.”). 
616 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
circumstances.104  All of this is consistent with a deferentialist conception 
of their judicial responsibilities; it does not make sense on an overtly 
political conception of them. 
For these reasons, I take the deferentialist conception of the legal 
responsibilities governing judicial application of the law to particular cases 
to be more descriptively accurate than the antideferentialist conception.  
Given the problematic nakedness of the legislative authority granted to the 
Supreme Court by the antideferentialist view, I suspect that a hybrid view 
that is partially deferentialist and partially not would be a stronger 
competitor. 
With this in mind, consider an alternative conception in which the Court 
can exercise its authority to alter the content of the law only in cases in 
which Deferentialism allows it to do so—when:  (1) the antecedent legal 
content is vague concerning aspects of the case needed to reach a result, or 
(2) that content plus the facts of the case inconsistently leads to 
contradictory results, or (3) the literal application of that content would 
produce a result that subverts the original rationale for its adoption.  
However, when one of these conditions is met, the Court is not, according 
to the hybrid conception, restricted to making the minimum change to 
existing law that reaches a result that maximizes the fulfillment of the 
original rationale for the law in question.  Rather, it can substitute its own 
moral and political judgment for those of the original lawmakers to produce 
a change in the law, provided that it articulates a reasoned argument that the 
change is an improvement that preserves aspects of the previous legal 
content not directly relevant to the case. 
The deferentialist aspects of this view are its conception of legal content 
and its restrictions on when the Court is justified in rectifying that content 
(by modifying or replacing it).  The nondeferentialist aspect of the view lies 
in the expanded legislative authority granted to the Court to change the law 
in the rectification process, with less respect paid to the content being 
replaced and minimal concern for the original legislative rationale for that 
content.  As before, one can judge this conception of judicial responsibility 
either normatively or descriptively.  The most obvious normative worry 
about the hybrid conception is that it gives unelected political actors with 
unlimited tenure too much authority to place matters beyond the reach of 
democratically elected representatives.  In so doing, it also puts the 
genuinely judicial function of the Court at risk.  By investing so much 
authority to change the law in the group that also decides what the content 
of existing law is, the hybrid approach risks losing the integrity needed to 
perform the latter, indispensible task.  The knowledge, abilities, and 
motivating interests needed to correctly discern existing legal content in 
difficult cases are very different from those needed to promulgate wise and 
politically effective new laws.  To authorize justices to perform both tasks 
 
 104. Code of Conduct for United States Judges, U.S. CT., http://www.uscourts.gov/
RulesAndPolicies/CodesOfConduct/CodeConductUnitedStatesJudges.aspx (last visited Oct. 
21, 2013). 
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is to risk having the tasks performed by individuals who are not good at 
either, and perhaps not much interested in the genuinely judicial task. 
Since I suspect these normative worries would be widely shared, I 
believe that the hybrid conception of judicial responsibility is not an 
accurate description of what the general populace plus the army of legal 
actors and public officials in the United States now take to be the authorized 
powers and responsibilities of the judiciary.105  Nor would those who like 
the results of Griswold, Roe, Casey, and Lawrence find the hybrid position 
normatively acceptable, since it too would prevent those results from being 
reached by any of the means the Court actually employed.  The problem for 
nondeferentialists of this stripe is that further departures from 
Deferentialism needed to vindicate those results would likely invite further 
defections from any suitably articulated principle of interpretation designed 
to reach them.  So, although Deferentialism is threatened and the legal 
norms governing the judicial application of the law to particular cases in the 
United States are in flux, the challenge of replacing Deferentialism remains 
unmet. 
That said, Deferentialism faces a challenge of its own.  Because of the 
many anti- or nondeferentialist decisions in past decades,106 any effective 
renewal of Deferentialism must include a strategy for dealing with the body 
of existing law created by those decisions.  Since neither wholesale 
revocation nor wholesale preservation of previous nondeferentialist 
decisions in their current form is compatible with a lasting deferentialist 
judiciary, finding a workable middle way is the most daunting task of 
rectification that confronts Deferentialism.  The way to think of this task is, 
I suggest, to treat it as a subcase of harmonization of conflicts in law, where 
(at least) one of the laws in conflict is judge made.  When the Supreme 
Court finds that the facts of a new case create a conflict between some valid 
legal provision and the law produced by a previous decision that the Court 
now finds unjustified, the task of the Court is to remove the conflict by 
making the minimal changes needed to the conflicting laws while 
furthering, to the extent possible, the rationales for both.  How this would, 
or should, work in particular cases is, of course, a large, open-ended 
question.  But the principle of respecting both laws, despite their 
provenance, and aiming for limited adjustments—which may, over time, 
become cumulative—is, I think, the best general procedure. 
 
 
 105. I suspect that for advocates of a “living Constitution,” this model remains too 
deferential, while for originalists, this model grants too much political autonomy. 
 106. See, e.g., supra notes 69–98 and accompanying text. 
